Armchair Generalist

Chem Demil Update

The US Army Chemical Materials Agency notes that an Oregon judge has ruled in favor of continuing incineration of its chemical munitions. Color me unsurprised.

Petitioners had challenged Oregon’s Department of Environmental Quality on the approval of a Temporary Authorization Request for the trial burn of mustard agent containing elevated levels of mercury. Petitioners had questioned the use of incineration as the best available technology, claiming other, safer methods were readily available and should be used instead. Petitioners had also alleged that the state agency had allowed the Army to operate in violation of hazardous waste laws, without a Clean Air Act Permit, and without adequate characterization of wastes. Hearings began on Oct. 26, 2009, and, after three days of testimony and argument, Judge Marcus ruled against petitioners on all counts.  
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 “We are confident in our technology in terms of eliminating the stockpile and in doing so safely and effectively,” said Col. Robert B. Billington, Project Manager for Chemical Stockpile Elimination at the CMA. “Scientifically, our technology continues to withstand these kinds of legal challenges and Judge Marcus’ ruling once again shows that the best available technology is truly in place to ensure public safety and environmental protection.

“Now we can shift our focus out of the courtroom and back to the mission at hand—safe, total and complete elimination of the stockpile and the risk it poses to our communities.” 

The next time you wonder why the Army's chem demil program is over budget and behind schedule, take a look at all the failed lawsuits that these idiotic critics of the program have brought forth. Certain members of Congress use these critics to get federal pork in their states, which adds to the waste of time and money. So instead of completing the stockpile destruction by 2012, it's going to extend to beyond 2017 primarily because of the actions of Sen. Mitch McConnell (R-KY).

Arguing About Definitions

David Hambling points to this report by Michael Crowley that discusses the challenges of addressing riot control agents (RCAs) and incapacitating chemical agents under the Chemical Weapons Convention. I think it's a load of crap - buncha lawyers arguing about what the definition of "is" is. 

For example, Article 1.5 of the CWC specifically prohibits the use of “riot control agents as a method of warfare.” However, the Convention fails to define ‘method of warfare.’ Similarly, although toxic chemicals are permitted for “law enforcement including domestic riot control purposes” under Article 2.9(d), neither the term ‘law enforcement’ nor ‘domestic riot control purposes’ are defined. In this case, the ambiguity caused by a lack of definition of these terms is exacerbated by the fact that there is a potential overlap between permissible ‘law enforcement’ activities and prohibited ‘methods of war.’ Certain commentators believe that such ambiguity was intentional, accommodating the interests of certain States. 

Much the report meanders on like this. Can military forces use tear gas if they are conducting law enforcement responsibilities, as one could argue the Russians did in that Moscow theater? Can law enforcement officials use incapacitants if they are participating in irregular warfare operations? WHO CARES? I know what toxic chemical warfare agents are, and I know that the US Senate got an exemption on RCAs when it ratified the CWC.

The argument I like the least is this idea by arms control enthusiasts that RCAs and incapacitants are like a gateway drug to more potent chemical warfare agents. It hasn't happened yet - the treaty wording and the specific agents that its inspectors are pretty clear. More importantly, the CWC treaty isn't something that the UN police force enforces. It's just a treaty, and if a country wants to get into offensive chemical warfare, it will do it. All this noise about RCAs and incapacitants is just an indication of CW inspectors who are bored because all the chemical weapons are going to be gone soon. And then what will they do?

There are a lot worse things than non-lethal chemical agents such as RCAs and incapacitants. In this new age of irregular warfare, it would be stupid to put these tools down because of lawyers bitching about shades of gray.

Worrying About Iranian Nukes

Rob Farley has an interesting observation about the alleged threat of a future Iranian nuclear weapon against Israel - that is, if Israel has such a kick-ass missile defense system, exactly what does Israel's government have to worry about a single Iranian nuke? And more importantly, why would Israel - or the United States - need to attack Iran's nuclear program to stop its progress?

Why does Israel need to attack Iran to destroy its nuclear program? The answer would seem to be some sort of nebulous claim about how Iranian nuclear weapons would somehow immeasurably improve Iran's negotiating position in the Middle East; Iran and its allies would suddenly become emboldened, or something. This ignores a) the reality that states balance against power and threat, and b) the reality that nuclear states very often have a bloody difficult time getting what they want from non-nuclear states. The entire argument seems based on a 1962 Paul Nitze vision of nuclear weapons, in which more nukes automatically grant extraordinary diplomatic leverage. Allowing that there's something to the stability-instability paradox, I think it's fair to say that nuclear weapons have, at best, proven to be blunt, unsophisticated, and not terribly useful tools of diplomacy.

In general, I agree with Rob and I like his argument. But I don't think he sees the regional aspect of this argument. I've heard Middle East experts express their concern that once Iran gets the bomb, its leadership doesn't intend to use it or give it to terrorists. That would be silly. But they will have an elevated statue in the region, and they might become more bold about backing Hezbollah terrorists attacks against non-Muslim interests in the region. And then they sit back and say, who us? We're just peaceful Persians. But don't screw with us.

It's not my point of view, but then again, I haven't been studying the Iranians for the past few decades. I understand concerns over an emboldened Iranian government that had extreme Islamic clerics running it, but it's still not a reason to attack the Iranian nuclear program. 

Nukes In Europe

The NY Times has this interesting article on discussions within the German government about the alleged presence of US non-strategic nuclear weapons in its country. Notably, the newly elected administration is thinking about ordering them out.

On the face of it, no issue could be better suited to Mr. Westerwelle who, as leader of the Free Democrats, has made this his foreign policy priority (and not Russia or Afghanistan). It is popular with a public staunchly opposed to nuclear weapons. All Mr. Westerwelle has to do, with support from Mrs. Merkel, is to ask the United States to remove the weapons when he visits the United States next month, days after Mrs. Merkel holds talks in Washington. And if Mr. Obama is true to his word, there is no reason why the United States could not take them out, as it has quietly done over the past few years from other locations in Germany and other West European countries belonging to NATO, according to German defense experts.

There are, however, two hurdles Mr. Westerwelle will have to jump. One is Europe’s two nuclear powers, Britain and France, which are afraid that after the U.S. arms are gone, their own nuclear weapons will come under scrutiny.

The other is resistance inside the U.S.-led NATO military alliance. Many member states are afraid that if the United States does pull all its weapons out from Germany and the rest of Europe, there would be negative consequences. The most important one is alliance solidarity, which is fragile enough because of the war in Afghanistan. “The weapons are the foundation of that solidarity. Take them away and what have we left?” said a NATO diplomat who requested anonymity because the issue is so sensitive in the 28-member alliance. 

Wow. Here we are, coming up on the 30th 20th anniversary of the fall of the Berlin wall, and we still have this Cold War mentality in place. You have to wonder exactly what the justification is - that the Russian bear can't be trusted? That we might need forward-deployed tactical nukes for use against Iran? The mind reels. If the British and French governments don't want to give up their nukes, then don't. At the strategic level, one can justify the need for a nuclear stockpile. But non-strategic (or tactical) nukes in Germany? Doesn't make sense. Time to move them out. 

Two other notes of interest. SecState Clinton has an article at Foreign Policy magazine talking about the Obama administration's nonproliferation posture. Her points are not too surprising:

We seek to strengthen each of the three mutually reinforcing pillars of global nonproliferation -- preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, promoting disarmament, and facilitating the peaceful use of nuclear energy. And to those three pillars, we should add a fourth: preventing nuclear terrorism.

The most effective way to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism is to ensure that nuclear materials that can be used to build weapons are well protected against theft or seizure. That is why the United States has proposed a plan to secure all vulnerable nuclear material worldwide within four years -- a plan that has now won the endorsement of the U.N. Security Council.

I don't like tying the issue of nuclear terrorism to how nations develop and stockpile nuclear weapons. To me, these are distinct issues that are complex enough without linking them together. But this administration is hot on the issue, just like the last one was. It's a knee-jerk reaction to over-inflated fears based on the wild statements of one terrorist organization who has desires but no capability.

However, it would seem that moving the US nukes out of Europe would be a positive step for the Obama administration. It ought not to disrupt the START negotiations, which are more focused on strategic nuclear weapons. And I'll stress again that no one is talking about unilateral disarmament within the next few years (or even the next decade). Clinton points out that a nuclear-free world may not happen in our lifetime (which is my bet). And so in the meantime, do we need to review the possibilities of what we would do in the event of a nuclear war? Andrew Krepinevich at the CSBA says yes, if we want to retain a secure future.

Cheney Made Up His Own Classification Guides

With the federal court's release of the various testimonies surrounding the Libby investigation (aka the Plame case), we get to find out that former VP Dick Cheney came up with his own logic for selectively releasing classified information. What a surprise...

"The vice president advised that it is possible to talk about something contained in a classified document without violating the law regarding declassification," according to the FBI report. Cheney said he had made "numerous statements about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction which were based on and, in some cases, tracked his reading of classified information," including a then-classified Iraq NIE.

He added that he "believed it was justifiable to rely on classified information to shape and inform what one says publicly," and that "this was a perfectly appropriate way to use the NIE."
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 But Cheney tried to get around that complaint [of illegal leaking] by adding a novel legal defense of his use of classified information. The FBI report said he told Fitzgerald that he "did not violate any relevant laws or rules in making these statements because he did not reveal the confidential sources or methods involved in gathering the classified information."

That is a totally new reading of a variety of statutes that make it a crime to disclose classified or national security information. For Cheney, however, it may have been valid, because President George W. Bush had given him declassification authority. So technically, his public disclosure of classified information automatically removed the classification.

I've never heard such horseshit about "declassification" in my career. I'll bet it's a pretty "unique" argument to everyone else who has to work with classified defense information as well. I don't think that Cheney was in any position to release classified information without a thorough scrub to ensure he wasn't revealing sources and methods, and he wouldn't be in a position to know. But what the hell, as long as he got his excuse to invade Iraq, why should he care about protecting US intelligence sources and methods of gathering that data?

UPDATE: Declassification guides from FOIA are here. Make your own judgments. But I will suggest that he revealed classified information that supported his conclusions for reasons other than the public interest - that is to say, it was in his own personal and political interest to do so.

Exaggerated Bio Threats

The Australian Courier Mail reports that the Department of Homeland Security is concerned that a rare virus found only in Australia might be used... as an agent of destruction by terrorists!!

"Americans see it as a potential bioterrorism weapon that's why (the department of) Homeland Security are funding research into viruses in bats," Dr Peter Reid said.

"There is no effective treatment or vaccine for Hendra or Nipah and the mortality rate is high.

"Bats are quite accessible and in the wrong hands it can pose quite a threat."

Bats are the host of both viruses, with the Nipah virus being the deadlier of the two, having killed hundreds in Malaysia, Bangladesh and India. 

Now there is no question that these viruses are bad, both have very high mortality rates. But here's the thing. Like all BW agents that rely on vectors, it's very hard to culture the virus, infect the bats (in this case), and then count on them to bite people/pigs/horses (whatever) and spread the disease. Usually we worry about the BW threat from insects rather than bats. This is a loser as a BW agent, and DHS is shooting blanks on this issue. Obviously the R&D people have too much money to spend if this is what worries them.

DOD is also getting into the concept that "emerging infectious diseases" are going to be part of their portfolio. It's as if both DHS and DOD have forgotten that there are other federal agencies that do this work - like DHHS and the CDC - and that there are a lot of top BW threat agents for which they still don't have vaccines or treatments. It's a ridiculous situation, where people in new positions of power seem to have little understanding of what they're supposed to be doing.

Brian Jenkins is a Golden God

I'm reading Brian Jenkin's "Will Terrorists Go Nuclear?" and I LOVE it. I was apprehensive at first, thought this was going to be another "oh noes, the terrorists are all going to nuke us" but it's not. It's a very level-headed review of terrorism and the other factors that result in nuclear terror. More next week, but here's a key passage:

When we accept the fact that they will one day destroy an American city in a horrific nuclear blast, we provide al Qaeda's terrorists with an enormous opportunity. If Americans are anxious, it serves the terrorists' cause to make us even more anxious. Our enemies are not stupid, and they realize that a campaign of terror might even yield what an act of terrorism could not.
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The alternative acronym [to WMD] CBRN ... specifies the instruments but no criterion for scale. In fact, there have already been a number of incidents in which terrorists have employed or have attempted to employ chemical weapons. These range from chlorine-enhanced truck bombs in Baghdad to the nerve-gas attack in Tokyo, which sent fifty-five hundred people to the hospital [most with imagined symptoms] but resulted in only twelve deaths. There also have been terrorist incidents involving ricin and anthrax, again with very few fatalities. CBRN weapons are not necessarily WMD.

These little statements, and others in the book, are absolute truths that many defense analysts and politicians in Washington DC just cannot accept. It would ruin their world view. The fact that a terrorism expert recognizes these points, rather than a WMD expert who should know this, is a great thing. There's hope for clarity yet. 

Our Convoluted CBRN Defense Policies

Israel and the United States are participating in a missile defense exercise called "Juniper Cobra," a biennial exercise between the two nations. The Haaretz newspaper describes it as "a preparation for a faceoff with Iran." That's really nice, because we really needed another reason to confirm Muslim suspicions that the US government is solidly in bed with Israel and working against Iran. 

This year, the Ohio CBRN Enhanced Response Force (CERF) has nine of its members joining the exercise to see how the Israeli Home Front Command does its job.

The Ohioans have been observing and participating in training with the Israeli Home Front Command (HFC) Search and Rescue School, Unit Training Branch. The HFC is similar to the National Guard in structure and mission. It is comprised mainly of reservists and serves the people of Israel through disaster relief, nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) operations, search and rescue, and supporting the Israeli Defense Force, which conducts all combat operations. 

Only three other state National Guards have done any type of exchange or training with the Israelis, the majority of which have been conducted in the U.S.  

“Any exchange is important,” Meislin said. “The CERF is very important to the HFC because they are exact counterparts. They are just really into saving lives no matter where it is, and so are we, so it’s a good fit.”

There's no question that the Israeli HFC has to be on its toes in this area, but then again, their nation is surrounded by countries with nasty munitions. Its chem-bio military compatriots in the IDF have a saying, "If they're using us, everyone else is either hiding, underground, or already dead." I have no issues with the training, but it's not exactly an "exact counterpart." The alleged domestic terrorist CBRN threat to the United States isn't close to what Israel has from external national WMD threats. But I suppose the Ohio CERF was bored from the lack of action here in the States and wanted some travel time.

Right now, we have the DOD trying to reform its former concept for three CCMRFs into 10 smaller units, not because they can identify the threat any better but it's "more efficient." It's still just as wasteful, lacking a real reason for being. We really lack a coherent strategy that describes what DOD is trying to do with consequence management, either in the domestic environment or in support of other nations (foreign CM). Part of the problem is that the US government doesn't really know what it wants, other than to respond with massive resources if/when the incident happens. But the threat assessment is overblown, the mass casualty incident isn't going to happen tomorrow, the resources are being wasted, and all the defense officials pretend that it's more important than what the situation really portends.

I don't think our current administration is any smarter about "countering WMD" than the last, in some respects. That's unfortunate, I actually had the notion that they might improve the academic discussion on this area. As a side note, I noticed Israeli press and other web sites referring to WMDs as "nonconventional warfare." That's not the same as unconventional warfare, which refers to special forces operations and guerilla warfare. But I know we used to refer to NBC weapons as "unconventional weapons" as opposed to conventional weapons - so do we now have unconventional warfare and nonconventional weapons for irregular warfare, and nonconventional warfare and unconventional weapons for nuclear warfare?

We're so confused.

Painting A Better Decon Strategy

Ray from the UK sends this article about the development of a self-stripping paint for military vehicles that would absorb chemical warfare agents and then fall off the side of the vehicle. No muss, no fuss.

"It's a single pack emulsion. It looks much like paint you'd find in a DIY store for painting your house. So you could apply it with a paint brush, or you could apply it with a roller. It's really flexible," Dr Mitchell explained.

"That's important for potential use in theatre because you might not have a sophisticated paint spray system available."

On the grounds of DSTL's headquarters, Dr Mitchell demonstrated how to remove the coating from a battlefield ambulance which had been painted for desert camouflage.

The coating on a rear door had been pre-scored with a knife; Dr Mitchell reached up to the raised tab and peeled back the rubbery skin by hand. The coating came away easily and largely in one piece.

While paint remained stuck to some raised areas such as bolts, he said remaining residue could be removed with a water power washer.

Before long, the whole door was stripped to the vehicle's dark green base colour. Dr Mitchell squashed the peeled coating into a lump and dropped it on the grass.

It's an interesting idea, one that the US Army has tried to develop over the past two decades without much success. In theory it's a great idea, especially if it can be designed to not require any additional decontamination or water (which even this British concept isn't quite at that stage). It may be a question of efficacy - that the military wants close to 100% of the agent to be absorbed into the paint, or that there still is a requirement for some aqueous decon to be executed on the vehicle. I'm not sure what the hold-up is, only that the magic Holy Grail of strippable, reactive and/or enzymatic coatings are still held out there as future possibilities.

Of course, what would help is if the DOD CB defense program invested more than a few paltry million dollars a year in this area. Just before the exciting journey to Iraq in 2003, the military realized that it had no modern decontamination capability and no modern decontaminant solution. So it had to buy commercial decon systems that used untested decon solutions and hot water and soap. It was pretty embarrassing, but they still haven't learned the lesson. Much more interesting to invest in exciting CB detection technologies and medical countermeasures that take decades to develop than boring decontamination, despite the unresolved issues in cleaning up after a CB weapons or CB terrorist attack.

Just another day in the Pentagon, where people refuse to address the really tough issues.

Our Convoluted CBRN Defense Policies

Israel and the United States are participating in a missile defense exercise called "Juniper Cobra," a biennial exercise between the two nations. The Haaretz newspaper describes it as "a preparation for a faceoff with Iran." That's really nice, because we really needed another reason to confirm Muslim suspicions that the US government is solidly in bed with Israel. 

This year, the Ohio CBRN Enhanced Response Force (CERF) has nine of its members joining the exercise to see how the Israeli Home Front Command does it.

The Ohioans have been observing and participating in training with the Israeli Home Front Command (HFC) Search and Rescue School, Unit Training Branch. The HFC is similar to the National Guard in structure and mission. It is comprised mainly of reservists and serves the people of Israel through disaster relief, nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) operations, search and rescue, and supporting the Israeli Defense Force, which conducts all combat operations. 

Only three other state National Guards have done any type of exchange or training with the Israelis, the majority of which have been conducted in the U.S.  

“Any exchange is important,” Meislin said. “The CERF is very important to the HFC because they are exact counterparts. They are just really into saving lives no matter where it is, and so are we, so it’s a good fit.”

There's no question that the Israeli HFC has to be on its toes in this area, but then again, their nation is surrounded by countries with nasty munitions. Its military compatriots have a saying, "If they're using us, everyone else is either hiding, underground, or already dead." I have no issues with the training, but it's not exactly an "exact counterpart." The alleged domestic threat to the United States isn't close to what Israel has from external threats. But I suppose the Ohio CERF was bored from the lack of action here in the States.

We have the DOD trying to reform its former plan for three CCMRFs into 10 smaller units, not because they can identify the threat any better but it's "more efficient." Still just as wasteful. We really lack a coherent strategy that describes what DOD is trying to do with consequence management, either in the domestic environment or in support of other nations (foreign CM). Part of the problem is that the US government doesn't really know what it wants, other than to respond if/when the incident happens. But the threat assessment is overblown, the resources aren't there, and we all pretend that it's more important than what OSD really thinks.

I don't think this new administration is any smarter about "countering WMD" than the last, in some respects. That's unfortunate. As a side note, I noticed the reference in the Israeli documents to "nonconventional warfare." That's not unconventional warfare, which refers to special forces operations and guerilla warfare. But I know we used to refer to NBC weapons as "unconventional weapons" - so do we have unconventional warfare and nonconventional weapons for irregular warfare and nonconventional warfare and unconventional weapons for nuclear warfare?

We're so confused.

Finel On Pakistan's Nukes

At the risk of having a Faux News clip contaminating my site, let me offer the opinion that Bernard Finel has offered some very sane commentary on the security of Pakistani nukes and why the fact that Pakistan may be building more nukes should not come as a surprise.

Iran's Nuclear Program - Facts and Myths

Joe Cirincione offers some insights on what he calls the five myths about Iran's nuclear program in the Washington Post.

1. Iran is on the verge of developing a nuclear weapon.

For years we've heard conflicting accounts on this issue. There have been claims since the 1990s that Iran was a few years away from a bomb. Then, two years ago, U.S. intelligence agencies concluded that Iran had discontinued its dedicated nuclear weapon efforts in 2003. Today, the consensus among experts is that Iran has the technical ability to make a crude nuclear device within one to three years -- but there is no evidence that its leaders have decided to do so.

2. A military strike would knock out Iran's program.

Actually, a military attack would only increase the possibility of Iran developing a nuclear bomb.

"There is no military option that does anything more than buy time," Defense Secretary Robert Gates said last month. "The estimates are one to three years or so." And that's if the United States struck hundreds of targets. A less powerful Israeli attack could only damage, not destroy, Iran's facilities.

3. We can cripple Iran with sanctions.

Sanctions rarely, if ever, work on their own. There is no silver bullet that can coerce Iran into compliance or collapse.

No nation has ever been forced to give up nuclear programs, but many have been persuaded to do so, including Brazil, Argentina, Ukraine, Belarus, Kazakhstan, South Africa, Iraq and, most recently, Libya.

4. A new government in Iran would abandon the nuclear program.

Some believe that an irrational, apocalyptic government now rules Iran and that regime change is the only solution. But there is broad support across Iran's political spectrum for the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

5. Iran is the main nuclear threat in the Middle East.

The real danger is not a nuclear-armed Iran but a Middle East with more nuclear-armed nations and unresolved territorial, economic and political disputes. That is a recipe for disaster, and that is why there is no country-specific solution; we cannot play nuclear whack-a-mole.

It's a complicated diplomatic issue, but not one that's going to be solved in the next year or by firey rhetoric and threats. The key is patience and long-term, consistent pressure along with the recognition that Iran will eventually have nuclear energy and can (in theory) be a partner nation in the international community.

Russia's "New" Global Strike Doctrine

Last week, there was a flurry of coverage on Russia's declaration that it would consider the option of pre-emptive nuclear strikes in its military doctrine. I am not sure that this is new doctrine in as much as it is a new review of existing policy, with the resulting decision being "yeah, this is what we want you imperialist aggressors to recognize."

While Moscow and Washington have made progress in strategic nuclear arms talks, Russia's security may come under threat from regional conflicts and local wars, Nikolai Patrushev, secretary of the Kremlin's powerful Security Council, said in an interview with Izvestia newspaper to be published on Wednesday.

Russia was revising its military doctrine to include new terms of use of its nuclear forces, he said, adding that President Dmitry Medvedev, who chairs the Security Council, would be presented with the new doctrine by the end of the year.

"Conditions of using nuclear weapons to repel an aggression with the use of conventional weapons not only in a large-scale but also in a regional and even local war have been revised," he said, without naming these conditions.

"Moreover, different variants are considered to allow the use of nuclear weapons depending on a certain situation and intentions of a would-be enemy. In conditions critical for national security one should not also exclude a preventive nuclear strike on the aggressor."

Russia's current doctrine says the "most important task is to be able to deter, including with the use of nuclear weapons, an aggression of any scale against Russia and its allies".

Really, this isn't too different than the US government's strategy. We abbreviate it by saying "reserve the right to retaliate, not necessarily in kind." I suppose the one difference is that the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review - and hopefully, the one being undertaken right now - tried to reduce the potential use of nuclear weapons by stating that conventional strikes with advanced precision munitions was an alternative to hitting sites previously targeted by nukes. One would hope that Russia might follow that logic. But in any regard, it's certainly interesting talk as the two superpowers negotiate the follow-on to the START treaty.

Nuke Mondays

News on how Congress is moving forward on modernizing nuclear warheads.

The lawmakers permitted $32.5 million to be spent next year on feasibility, design and cost studies for the non-nuclear components of the B61-12 tactical nuclear bomb, according to their report released this week on the fiscal 2010 Energy and Water Appropriations Bill. The measure contains funds for the nation's nuclear weapons programs.
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Focus has also been on the B61 because it is the nuclear weapon currently deployed in Europe for use by NATO, and must either complete refurbishing or be rebuilt, as is being considered. In a speech last month, Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates said the Nuclear Posture Review "in one or two cases" will "probably [recommend] new designs" for nuclear weapons "that will be safer and more reliable."

The B61 was first produced in 1966, with the number increasing in the 1970s as new modifications were introduced. In 2000, models of the B61-7 and B61-11 were put into refurbishment programs to extend their lives for 20 years. 

I don't think it's cheating on the arms control community if the work is limited to modernizing non-nuclear parts of the warheads, and no additional warheads are made functional. It actually makes a lot of sense. Let's get it on. 

Still A Bad Idea

Back in August, I blogged about an idea that was floating around the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) issue teams - that instead of fielding three CBRNE Consequence Management Response Forces (CCMRF), each one about 4500 troops, DOD ought to develop ten smaller teams and align them with the ten FEMA regions. Now DefenseNews reports that the plans continue to mature. 

As part of the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the Pentagon is "considering options to improve DoD [chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear] response," states a U.S. Army Reserve QDR planning document obtained by Defense News.

As part of that effort, the department "is considering reducing [the] size of CCMRFs to create 10 regionally aligned 'Homeland Response Forces,' states the document, stamped "For Official Use Only."

White confirmed the department is considering the region-based Homeland Response Forces concept, but said she could not comment further because the QDR is not yet complete.

The idea behind the CCMRFs is to have stand-by units Washington can call up after a chemical, biological or radioactive strike on America. Only the president could activate the teams, though a governor can request the president do so, according to a DoD fact sheet. 

I am still of the opinion that this capability is not required. This isn't 1995. We have 55 WMD Civil Support Teams, 12+ CBRNE Emergency Response Force Packages (CERF-Ps), the Marine Corps CBIRF and the Army's 20th Support Command (CBRNE). In addition, we have DHS and lots of federal funds going to the states and cities to procure specialized equipment and training. DOD isn't the only keeper of expertise on terrorism CB incidents anymore, and it shouldn't try to stretch itself by trying to meet a very unrealistic scenario - having to be prepared to respond to three simultaneous terrorist CBRN incidents across the United States.  

I know the background on this, and the question isn't about the need for more DOD response forces is sound as much as it is an efficiency exercise for OSD. The DOD isn't willing to use active duty forces for the three CCMRFs, due to their size, so why is 10 smaller units a better thing? They'd be "closer" to the potential action, not that there's been any threat indications or trends that show the need for this capability. It's a travesty, but the people who know better aren't going to risk the conventional wisdom that DOD is the only agency standing between you and CBRN hazards caused by terrorists running rampant over the United States. No truth to power here, folks. Move along.

DTRA's Shy About Its Studies

The FAS Secrecy News blog has a revelation - the Defense Threat Reduction Agency did have a number of its unclassified WMD studies on line, available to the public, and then *poof!* they disappeared. Fortunately, nothing is ever truly gone once surfaced on the internet.

The Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) recently deleted the publications web page for its Advanced Systems and Concepts Office, inhibiting broad public access to many of the agency’s arms control and proliferation-related studies.  But most of the affected DTRA publications have been recovered and reposted in a new DTRA archive on the Federation of American Scientists website.

DTRA’s public affairs office was unable or unwilling to explain the deletion of the ASCO publications web page, except to indicate that it was a policy decision, not an accident. A 2008 version of the now-deleted DTRA page is available via the Internet Archive.
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Whatever DTRA’s motivation may have been, impeding public access to archived public records on government websites is an unwholesome act.  So we have taken steps to reverse it.  See our compilation of selected DTRA reports.

It's a failure in our government that senior government officials have this habit that, whenever they say the word "WMD" (in something other than a political speech), it has to stay out of the public eye. After all, the laypersons can't possibly appreciate the deep insights of Very Serious People. So thanks to the FAS for its vigilance and providing these studies for viewing.

Casual Fridays

An entry in the Harvard's Sanders Theatre for the 19th Ig Nobel Prize Ceremony, here is the "gas mask bra."

Elena N. Bodnar, Raphael C. Lee, and Sandra Marijan of Chicago secured the Public Health title for their brassiere which, "in an emergency, can be quickly converted into a pair of gas masks, one for the brassiere wearer and one to be given to some needy bystander."
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Other laureates were Stephan Bolliger, Steffen Ross, Lars Oesterhelweg, Michael Thali and Beat Kneubuehl of the University of Bern, for "Are Full or Empty Beer Bottles Sturdier and Does Their Fracture-Threshold Suffice to Break the Human Skull?", and Javier Morales, Miguel Apátiga, and Victor M. Castaño of Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, immortalised for "Creating Diamonds From Liquid - Specifically From Tequila".

It's a thing of genius. I fully expect the county officials around Pueblo, Colorado, and Blue Grass, Kentucky, to demand that the US Army procure this potentially life-saving equipment for all of its women-folk, as the Army continues its storage of chemical munitions at those two sites over the next decade.

Television's Poor Fact-Checking

I probably am going to be accused of taking things on television dramas too seriously, but it annoys me when those writers of television dramas aren't willing to do a basic check on their facts prior to developing scripts for top-rated shows. Last Thursday on Fringe, we saw a story where a former Army colonel had a squad of soldiers who were taking a mysterious serum that, when exposed to a certain radiofrequency, caused their bodies to explode. Why he was keying them to explode was not well explained, butPopular Mechanics ran this article discussing the possibility of creating "human bombs." Interesting discussion there.

I wasn't so upset with the fanciful idea of radio-activated human bombs as I was the reason why these military personnel were using the serum. Our intrepid Fringe investigators found out that this squad had all been in Iraq during the recent Gulf War, where they had been exposed to low levels of  Saddam's nerve agents - specifically, cyanogen chloride. My jaw dropped. Let's leave aside the fact that Saddam had no chemical weapons in 2003 (excepting a pile of rusting mustard-filled artillery rounds), did they really have to state that cyanogen chloride - a World War I-era blood agent - was a nerve agent? Did they think that someone might say, "hey, I'm going to run out and get me some sarin" if they used the name of an actual nerve agent? VERY disappointed.

And then there was the CSI: Miami show on Monday. I don't watch the show, David Caruso was dead to me after he left NYPD Blue. But the show opens on a beach volleyball tournament, where four young hunky guys are batting the ball around, showing off (it appears) to their cougar girlfriends in the stands. Suddenly, three of the four players collapse on the sand, and the one unaffected participant runs up to his beach buddy and attempts to help out. The initial police suspicion? Chemical or biological terrorism. The hazmat team uses level B suits to check it out (should be level A suits, since they don't know what the source is). 

Riiiiigggghttt. Because we all know that when terrorists use CB hazards in public places, they are able to target individuals standing a few meters from each other without harming anyone in the crowd of 40-50 people surrounding the beach volleyball court. Really? CB terrorism is your first call, not food poisoning, not heat stroke, not heart attacks, not any number of other much more plausible causes? Fortunately, the intrepid CSI team ruled out CB terrorism because they couldn't find residues in the area - not thinking perhaps that volatile chemicals could have evaporated in Miami or that biotoxins could have been dispersed by the wind.

Hey Hollywood? Really, I am ready to come anytime you want to be your CBRN expert on these shows. Just say the word. I'll be there. I'm not cheap, but I can be had.

Chem Demil Update

The US Army Chemical Materials Agency announced the destruction of its two millionth chemical munition and/or ton container. It was only eight years ago when it passed the one million mark.  YEAHHHHH!!!! From the announcement letter (not yet available on its site):

CMA Director Conrad F. Whyne said of the accomplishment, "The professional, dedicated government and contract workers at all of our locations are making great strides to safely eliminate our chemical weapons stockpile, making our nation and the world safer."

CMA has come a long way to reach this destruction benchmark. The neutralization sites at Aberdeen, Md., and Newport, Ind., as well as the incineration site at Johnston Atoll, have successfully destroyed their stockpiles of chemical warfare materiel and are closed or being closed. The four remaining sites at Anniston, Ala., Pine Bluff, Ark., Tooele, Utah, and Umatilla, Ore., use incineration, a proven safe and effective treatment. In addition, CMA's Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel Project (NSCMP) has made substantial progress assessing and treating chemical materiel separate from the national stockpile. NSCMP also beat the treaty deadline for destruction of the nation's chemical warfare production facilities.

That leaves only 1,440,021 chemical munitions and/or ton containers to go, including the two ACWA sites (Colorado and Kentucky). If you leave those two sites out (due to an OSD acquisition decision, the incineration sites were separated from the neutralization sites), that's only 558,159 munitions/ton containers to go into the furnaces by 2012-2013. CMA has also had the distinction of having exactly zero chemical agent incidents that resulted in agent escaping into the local community. Safe and efficient, if not on schedule or cost - but that's the way Congress wanted it.

North Korea Bio Threat

The London Times talks about a threat assessment by South Korea about its northern neighbors. In particular, this story discusses the potential chem-bio threat that the North Korean military might be developing. However, it's the nuclear threat that stays on their mind.

 In a submission to the South Korean National Assembly, the Defence Minister also said that the North had 5,000 tonnes of chemical weapons, believed to include mustard gas, phosgene and sarin. Among its biological agents are cholera, yellow fever, smallpox, typhus, typhoid fever and dysentery.

Despite the alarming assessment, Kim Tae Young also said that his country’s armed forces had the capacity pre-emptively to destroy about a hundred sites connected to the North’s nuclear programme in the event of an imminent attack.

“We have a complete list of them,” Mr Kim said, adding that the North Korean military may not have achieved the technological breakthroughs necessary to attach nuclear warheads to a missile delivery system or launch them from a bomber.

“It is not clear whether North Korea has nuclear arms,” he said. “But we have sufficient information on the locations where items related to the nuclear programme are stored and where the delivery means are placed.”

It's a funny thing. We've always talked about the North Korean CB weapons threat, in broad generic terms. No one really knows what will happen if North Korea attacked and used CB weapons to clear its way toward Seoul and beyond. Our troops are pretty well protected, and the South Korean military and populace are at least prepared for the possibility. But all that's on their mind is the nuclear threat that really hasn't been proven much more than a fizzle at the bottom of a mine shaft.