
I have nothing but praise for Brian Jenkins' book, "
Will Terrorists Go Nuclear?" This book takes the very rare step of critically looking at terrorists and saying, hey, let's look past the rhetoric and see what they really are doing. Unlike many technical experts such as
Michael Levi who examines the difficulties of nuclear terrorism from the side of materials, Jenkins takes a long view - since the 1970s - and examines the people who've been involved in terrorism analyses as well as the terrorists.
The most interesting aspect of this book is the idea that there is a difference between nuclear weapons capability and nuclear terror - the latter being an ability to cause terror without a nuclear weapon. Jenkins explains this is a cumulative effect, starting with scientists and analysts who all believed that future terrorists were masterminds who would hold cities hostage with NBC weapons. He calls them the "apocalyticians." Instead of working out the most probable threat - nuclear fizzles of less than 1 kiloton, which could still bring down a building - they focused on 10 kT city busters. Why? Well, why not, say the apocalyticians. Obviously all terrorists are masterminds who can craft diabolical plots, get access to expert scientists and unlimited fissile material, and only have the destruction of Western civilization on their minds.
Now add to this mix those critics of nuclear energy and wants to use the specter of nuclear terrorism as an excuse to shut down nuclear power plants; an American population who is already susceptible to terror flashes because of historical, cultural, and religious reasons; US politicians pushing fear to drive votes and government agencies pushing fear to gain budgets; and a mass media that thrives on sensationalistic newstories and unchecked rumors. Result - nuclear terror writ large. The terrorists never have to get a bomb, all they have to do is say, "sure, we're thinking of it" and the system does the work for them.
This is a deep book. Jenkins looks at a history of bin Laden and the Chechen terrorists, as well as A.Q. Khan. He investigates the "red mercury" and "suitcase nukes" as well as the notion that terrorists could purchase fissile material or obtain it from countries with nuclear power plants. He talks about wargaming both sides of the issue - what exactly would a terrorist group do with a nuclear weapon? How are its demands going to be met? How would a government deter a terrorist organization from seeking out this capability? At the end of the book, he walks the reader through a scenario where the president of the United States has to face a situation where a nuclear bomb does go off in Manhattan. The reader is bombarded with questions - what will you do? - as two staffers, representing the extremes of the issue (a hawk and a dove) battle over the options.
There is some irony that Jenkins thought in 1979 that the fact of nuclear terrorism might provoke a crackdown on civil liberties, to include increased police actions and the use of "previously prohibited interrogation techniques." He admits that he never contemplated waterboarding, or that the bar would be so low today. Here's the bottom line:
Terrorists will never have enough nuclear weapons of sufficient destructive power to destroy an entire country. More likely, their arsenal will be limited to one or two low-yield devices. The losses would still be tragic, but the republics will survive - wounded, angry, determined, and very dangerous.
This is not to say that we should not do anything. There are certainly actions that can and should be taken: continuing nonproliferation activities, securing highly enriched uranium, clearly stating deterrence goals, focusing on intelligence activities, and strengthening international cooperation. But at the end of the day, we cannot allow ourselves to be terrorized by the thought of "it's only a question of when, not if."
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